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COMMENTS
FINN OR KERN? DOES A FLORIDA DISSOLUTION COURT
POSSESS AUTHORITY TO COMPEL CHILD SUPPORT OF
HEALTHY, MAJORITY-AGE CHILDREN WHO ARE
ATTENDING COLLEGE?
LAWRENCE A. KELLOGG
In 1973, the Florida legislature lowered the age of majority from
twenty-one to eighteen.' It also enacted section 743.07, which pro-
vides that, prospectively, eighteen year old persons "shall enjoy
and suffer the rights, privileges, and obligations" of those persons
who are twenty-one.' This portion of the legislation is limited by a
proviso which allows "any court of competent jurisdiction" to re-
quire support for a "dependent person" over age eighteen, and for
a "crippled child."' In other words, a court can require support for
1. Act of July 1, 1973, ch. 73-21, 1973 Fla. Laws 59 (current version at FLA. STAT. §
1.01(14)(1979)).
2. Act of July 1, 1973, ch. 73-21, 1973 Fla. Laws 59, as amended by Act of October 1,
1980, ch. 80-74, § 5, 1980 Fla. Laws 254 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 743.07 (Supp.
1980)). Section 743.07 provides as follows:
Rights, privileges, and obligations of persons 18 years of age or
older.-
(1) The disability of nonage is hereby removed for all persons in this state who
are 18 years of age or older, and they shall enjoy and suffer the rights, privileges,
and obbligations of all persons 21 years of age or older except as otherwise ex-
cluded by the State Constitution immediately preceding the effective date of this
section and except as otherwise provided in the Beverage Law.
(2) This section shall not prohibit any court of competent jurisdiction from re-
quiring support for a dependent person beyond the age of 18 years; and any crip-
pled child as defined in chapter 391 shall receive benefits under the provisions of
said chapter until age 21, the provisions of this section to the contrary
notwithstanding.
(3) This section shall operate prospectively and not retrospectively, and shall
not affect the rights and obligations existing prior to July 1, 1973.
FLA. STAT. § 743.07 (Supp. 1980). The legislature recently created the exception that eigh-
teen year olds are not legally permitted to consume alcohol. Act of October 1, 1980, ch. 80-
74, §§ 1-4, 1980 Fla. Laws 254.
3. Act of July 1, 1973, ch. 73-21, 1973 Fla. Laws 59 (current version at FLA. STAT. §
743.07(2)(Supp. 1980)). It is provided that "crippled child" shall be defined "as in chapter
391." However, FLA. STAT. ch. 391 (1979) contains no definition of crippled child. Formerly,
that chapter defined "crippled child," in part, as follows:
391.01 Definition of "a crippled child."-- "[A] crippled child" is defined as
any person of normal mentality under the age of twenty-one years whose physical
functions or movements are impaired by accident, disease or congenital deformity,
regardless of whether or not such impaired physical functions or movements are
due to an orthopedic condition; it shall include children suffering from any disease
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some persons over the age of eighteen even though they are legally
adults. 4
Section 61.13, Florida Statutes,' provides that a court, in a disso-
lution of marriage proceeding, may require either or both parents
"owing a duty of support" to provide for any or all marital chil-
dren. In addition, a dissolution court possesses continuing jurisdic-
tion to modify the amount or terms of ordered support payments.e
In a series of appellate decisions, Florida courts have grappled with
whether section 743.07 empowers a dissolution court to award
child support under section 61.13 to the parent with custody of an
adult "dependent person."
Before the age of majority was lowered to eighteen, the question
whether single parents of offspring in college could be awarded
child support was rarely raised because parents could be required
to educate their minor children,7 and because most offspring at-
tending college have almost graduated by the time they reach
twenty-one.'
With legal majority now routinely preceding economic auton-
or condition which is likely to result in a crippling condition.
Act of June 16, 1947, ch. 24366, 1947 Fla. Laws 1587.
4. This provision creates, in effect, a separate class of adults who are "dependent
adults," which is in direct conflict with common law notions of "adult." See Hanley v. Lib-
erty Mut. Ins. Co., 334 So.2d 11 (Fla. 1976). In Hanley, it was stated that
The obligation of a normal adult is to care for himself. A person may not be a
dependent member of a family and an independent adult at the same time; this
would be a contradiction of terms. Thus, an 18 year old has no legal obligation
within the family and, as such, has no legal benefit of support.
Id. at 12. Generally, there is no obligation for parental support for children who have
reached legal age. See, e.g., Warren v. Warren, 306 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
5. (1979). Section 61.13(1) provides as follows:
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court may at any time order
either or both parents owing a duty of support to a child of the marriage to pay
such support as from the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case is
equitable. The court initially entering an order requiring one or both parents to
make child support payments shall have continuing jurisdiction after the entry of
such initial order to modify the amount of the child support payments, or the
terms thereof, when such is found to be necessary by the court for the best inter-
ests of the child or children, when the child or any one of the children has reached
the age of 18 years, or when such is found to be necessary by the court because
there has been a substantial change in the circumstances of the parties. The court
initially entering a child support order shall also have continuing jurisdiction after
the entry of such order to require the person or persons awarded custody of the
child or children to make a report to the court on terms prescribed by the court as
to the expenditure or other disposition of said child support payments.
FLA. STAT. § 61.13(1) (1979).
6. Id.
7. See FLA. STAT. § 61.13(1) (1979).
8. Nicolay v. Nicolay, 387 So. 2d 500, 501 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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omy, the issue has become whether the phrase "dependent person"
includes those offspring who are attending college, and, if so,
whether a dissolution court is empowered to require parental sup-
port for them. These issues have been resolved by Florida courts in
three differing, but related postures. First, it has been determined
that a court may not award involuntary child support which lasts
beyond the age of eighteen; a separate determination of depen-
dency is required for adult offspring.9 Second, the courts have split
over the propriety of support which is initially awarded to a parent
of a healthy adult offspring who is found to be a "dependent per-
son." 10 Third, the courts have disagreed about modifying a child
support order at the time of the child's majority in a manner which
reflects the child's dependent status. 1
A primary definitional issue raised by section 743.07 is what con-
stitutes a "dependent person." The appellate decisions have unani-
mously held that offspring with physical or mental disabilities are
dependent.12 The courts do not agree about healthy offspring who
are economically dependent because they elect to pursue a college
education.'8
Parents have an obligation to "nurture, support, educate, and
protect" their children." In many states, this duty has been inter-
preted to include the provision of a college education. 8 Some Flor-
ida courts have assumed that the duty to educate does not extend
to providing a college education to one's adult offspring.' Al-
though parents may be morally obligated to support an adult child
in college, some courts reason that they are not legally so obli-
gated.' 7 To courts which distinguish between legally-imposed obli-
gations and those imposed by custom or morality, the absence of a
statutory duty creates an insurmountable obstacle to any construc-
tion of section 743.07 which would indicate that a dissolution court
possesses power to require parental support for an adult offspring
9. See, e.g., Genoe v. Genoe, 373 So. 2d 940, 942 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
10. See, e.g., Finn v. Finn, 312 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1975); White v. White, 296 So. 2d 619
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
11. See, e.g., Finn v. Finn, 312 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1975); White v. White, 296 So. 2d 619
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
12. See, e.g., Perla v. Perla, 58 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1952).
13. See, e.g., Kern v. Kern, 360 So. 2d 482, 485 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct, App. 1978).
14. Finn v. Finn, 312 So. 2d 726, 730 (Fla. 1975).
15. H. CLARK JR., THE LAW OF Douszrmc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 15.1 (1968);
Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 1207 (1957).
16. See, e.g., Kern v. Kern, 360 So. 2d 482, 485 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978); White v.
White, 296 So. 2d 619, 623-24 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
17. French v. French, 303 So. 2d 668, 669 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
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who is dependent because of his college attendance. The objection
is that such power would enable a dissolution court to accomplish
indirectly what it is incapable of accomplishing directly: divorced
parents would be obligated to assist in the payment of the adult
child's college expenses, while married parents would have no simi-
lar obligation.
This comment will examine the statutory and case authority
dealing with a dissolution court's power to award support to de-
pendent adult offspring and will review the law with respect to
whether attendance at college renders a child who has reached ma-
jority "dependent" for the purposes of section 743.07.
I. THE CONFUSED AND CONFLICTING CASELAW
The Florida District Courts of Appeal have been very reluctant
to compel parents of a dissolved marriage to provide their children
with a college education. As a result, the Florida Supreme Court's
clear teaching on this point has been ignored or distinguished as
dicta.
The First District Court of Appeal's decision in White v. White"'
is a good illustration of the proposition that the provision of a col-
lege education, while helpful, is not included within the parent's
legal obligation to support his offspring. In 1969, a final decree of
divorce was entered by the dissolution court (without an express
termination date) which provided that the father pay child sup-
port."" The child reached age eighteen in 1972, and in 1973, after
the passage of section 743.07, the father stopped support pay-
ments, contending that the child was now an adult. After the
mother procured an order to show cause why the father should not
be held in contempt for failure to comply with the court's support
order, the dissolution court ordered the father to continue making
support payments, reasoning that the child was unemployed and
attending junior college and therefore "dependent" regardless of
majority.20 The father appealed, and the first district reversed,
holding that attendance at college does not render one a "depen-
dent person."21
18. 296 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
19. Id. at 620. The order was subsequently modified in 1970 and 1971 as to the amounts
required to be paid. These modifications also did not provide for a termination date. Id.
20. Id. at 621. The trial judge stated that "in the court's opinion, (the son) is entitled to
a college education at the expense of his parents." Id.
21. Id. at 623. As authority, the court relied upon Carmody v. Carmody, 230 So. 2d 40
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970). In Carmody, the court held that a father had no duty to
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The court reasoned that the legislature intended support to con-
tinue only when the adult children are dependent because of phys-
ical or mental deficiencies." Prior caselaw was examined in which
various courts held that parental support beyond the age of major-
ity is predicated upon the child's state of dependency caused by
some physical or mental disability."8 In addition, the court deter-
mined that the language used by the legislature in section 743.07
specifies that a court may only order support payments for physi-
cally or mentally impaired adult children.14
Policy considerations played an important role in the district
court's decision. Although providing the means to obtain a college
education was determined by the court to be a "laudable" parental
contribution, it was not held to be a legally enforceable parental
obligation. Since a child cannot bring suit against his married par-
ents to force them to provide a college education, the court rea-
soned from an underlying equal protection premise that the mere
fact of divorce should not operate to create an otherwise nonexis-
tent parental obligation for a subclass of divorced parents. 5 This
support a child in college because the child's "disabilities of non-age" had been removed.
230 So. 2d at 41. The court also relied upon Register v. Register, 230 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1970). In Register, the court stated that whether a child should be allowed
support during college is a discretionary decision that depends on various factors which
"continue to exist until a dependent child reaches his or her majority." 230 So. 2d at 684.
Accord, Robertson v. Robertson, 312 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975), Ruhnau v.
Rahnau, 299 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
22. 296 So. 2d at 623.
23. The court cited Perla v. Perla, 58 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1952). In Perla, the court held that
because of the terms of a property settlement, a father had no obligation to contribute to
the support of a 33 year old mentally retarded and spastic daughter. The court noted that
while the agreement ended the father's obligation to the mother, it did not necessarily re-
lieve him of a future direct duty to the daughter because of the parental duty to support a
disabled offspring past the age of majority. 58 So. 2d at 689-70. See also Briggs v. Briggs,
312 So.2d 762 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975)(absent dependency based upon physical or
mental deficiencies, a parent has no obligation to contribute to his 23 year old son's college
education); Fincham v. Levin, 155 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1963). In Fincham, the
First District Court of Appeal stated that "most jurisdictions hold that where a child is of
weak body or mind, unable to care for itself after coming of age, the parental rights and
duties remain practically unchanged and the parent's duty to support the child continues as
before." Id. at 884.
24. 296 So. 2d at 623.
25. Id. at 623-24. The court explained its "domestic whirlwinds" theory:
It is certainly desirable and laudable for parents to encourage their offspring to
get a college education if he or she is college material. However, there are many
parents who enjoy complete domestic tranquility but who do not, either from per-
sonal choice of inability or otherwise, give their children a college education. The
fact that domestic whirlwinds cause a severance of the marriage does not enhance
the rights of the children nor alter the obligation of the parents. Certainly if the
parents were still married and enjoying domestic harmony a suit would not lie by
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consideration appears to have been of equal importance to the
court's decision as its examination of prior case law and its deter-
mination of legislative intent.16
Judge McCord dissented from the majority's opinion on two
grounds. First, he argued that the language of section 743.07(3)
clearly indicates that the legislature intended the statute to have
prospective application,"7 and that therefore the statute does not
operate to nullify the dissolution court's support order upon the
child's reaching age eighteen.' 8 The only remedy available to the
father, according to Judge McCord, was to petition the court to
modify its order of support based upon the child's independent
status. Second, he argued, the word "dependency" is not limited to
a determination of whether the child is mentally or physically dis-
abled; the legislature did not prohibit consideration of a child's
quest for a college education during a court's determination of the
adult child's dependent status.'
Shortly thereafter, in Finn v. Finn,80 the Florida Supreme Court
approved Judge McCord's dissenting opinion in White, and stated
that enrollment in college does not "classify the son or daughter as
utterly independent." 81 In Finn, the trial court rendered a final
judgment of dissolution in 1971, awarding the mother custody of
twin boys and ordering the father to pay weekly child support. Af-
ter the passage of section 743.07, the father discontinued support
payments and the mother sought an order from the dissolution
court enforcing the child support obligations contained in the final
judgment. The court entered an enforcement order, noting that the
the child on either parent to require parental support for a college education.
Neither may such be accomplished in a dissolution of marriage forum.
Id. (emphasis in original).
26. The importance of the court's policy considerations is underscored by the express
adoption of them by the Third District Court of Appeal in Kroger v. Kroger, 320 So. 2d 483,
484-85 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975). See also Genoe v. Genoe, 373 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1979).
27. See note 2 supra.
28. 296 So. 2d at 624.
29. Id. Judge McCord noted that:
The question of whether or not the offspring is satisfactorily pursuing an educa-
tion to become better equipped for life and the reasonableness of such pursuit
would be relevant to the question of his dependency. The legislature... used the
words "dependent person." It did not limit dependent persons to disabled persons
or to disabled dependent persons, although it could have done so if it had in-
tended such limited interpretation.
Id.
30. 312 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1975).
31. Id. at 730.
FINN OR KERN?
terms of the original judgment required the father to support the
twins until their twenty-first birthday. It was also observed in the
order that both twins were attending college and were not physi-
cally or mentally handicapped.8'
The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that sec-
tion 743.07 applied prospectively and would not nullify the father's
obligation to support his dependent children until they reached
age twenty-one.8 It was implicit in the holding that the third dis-
trict read "dependent person" as including more than just those
who are mentally or physically disabled and that the twins' attend-
ance at college rendered them "dependent.""
In approving the third district's decision in Finn, the Florida Su-
preme Court held that the attainment of majority "does not auto-
matically change a court order which either by its terms or by im-
plication would be operative until the 21st birthday."3 In this
case, the implication that the support obligation existed until the
twins reached twenty-one was inferred exclusively from the fact
that the support order was issued prior to the passage of section
743.07. Such an inference would not be rational for support orders
issued after the statute's passage; rather, the implication would
then be that the obligation terminates when the child reaches eigh-
teen. This distinction is important because it was subsequently
used by other courts to distinguish Finn.
The supreme court continued beyond its express holding, and
32. Id. at 727.
33. Finn v. Finn. 294 So. 2d 57, 59 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974), aff'd, 312 So. 2d 726
(Fla. 1975).
34. The first district's opinion in White attempted to distinguish the third district's
opinion in Finn by stating that the original support order in Finn contained an express
provision requiring the father to support the twins until they reached twenty-one. As the
Florida Supreme Court noted, this interpretation of the original Finn order was erroneous.
312 So. 2d at 729. In actuality, the appellate court in Finn held that the obligation to sup-
port the twins existed by the operation of law, which was unaffected by the later change in
the age of majority brought about by § 743.07.
35. 312 So. 2d at 730. As support, the court cited Field v. Field, 291 So. 2d 654, 654 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974)(trial court's sua sponte modification of the termination of a child
support order from age twenty-one to age eighteen was a misinterpretation of § 743.07), and
Ackerly v. Ackerly, 296 So. 2d 66, 67 (FI. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974)("the mere fact that the
child has reached the age of majority of 18 is not retroactive and does not terminate the pre-
existing rights of the child"). See also Burgdorf v. Burgdorf, 372 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1979); Manganiello v. Manganiello, 359 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978);
Swallick v. Swallick, 351 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Adams v. Adams, 340
So. 2d 1290 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Upchurch v. Ely, 333 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1976); Mosa-Jacober v. Moss, 334 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Rouse v.
Rouse, 313 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Rudnick v. Solomon, 311 So. 2d 385
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
1981]
114 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:107
indicated that the term "dependent person" may have a broader
definition than the one utilized in White, even for those orders
rendered after the passage of section 743.07. Observing that a col-
lege education flows from the parent's duty to "nurture, support,
educate and protect" his minor children, the court stated that
"certainly enrollment in undergraduate classes in a college does
not classify the son or daughter as utterly independent." '86 In order
to be dependent, the child must attend college in good faith, and
must have an actual need for support which is beyond his ability to
fulfill.87
The definition of dependency fashioned in White was deemed by
the supreme court to be "much too narrow."' 8 The court stated its
belief that a college education is a necessary preparation for suc-
cess in life, and that parental support for the attainment of a col-
lege degree should therefore be encouraged.
In this age of sophisticated technology and economic complex-
ity with the necessity of development of special skills to qualify
for pursuit of a trade, profession or to obtain employment, a per-
son over 18 and less than 21 may indeed be dependent on the
help of others to obtain what education and training is needed to
be competitive in the economic system in which he must make his
way. He and society have a right to expect his parents to meet
that need to the reasonable extent of their ability to do so, and
nothing in (section 743.07) says otherwise. 8'
A. The Application of Finn and White to Subsequent Cases
After the decisions in Finn and White, the various Florida dis-
trict courts of appeal split over whether a dissolution court has au-
thority to order support of a healthy adult dependent child of a
dissolved marriage. As will be shown, some courts have followed
White and distinguished or ignored Finn, while others have fol-
lowed Finn.
1. The First District's Approach
The first reported opinion which distinguished Finn was Dwyer
36. 312 So. 2d at 730 (emphasis added).
37. Id. The court rejected the father's argument that requiring parental support past age
18 would make the parent a "quasi-surety" of the child's fulfillment of a desire to "lounge
around in college for 10 years" rather than finding work. Id.
38. Id. at 731.
39. Id. at 730-31.
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v. Dwyer.4 e In 1969, a divorce decree was granted which required
the father to support his two children indefinitely. After the older
child became self-supporting and the younger child reached the
age of eighteen, the father sought modification of the decree for
the purpose of terminating support payments. The dissolution
court terminated support for the older child, but ordered contin-
ued support for the college-bound younger child.41 The First Dis-
trict Court of Appeal reversed, holding that an adult offspring's
attendance at college did not render him dependent.4 2
First, it was noted that the dissolution court made no express
finding that the younger child was dependent, as is required by
both section 743.07 and Finn.43 Second, the language in Finn
which contemplated that an adult offspring seeking a college edu-
cation could be found dependent was dismissed as dictum.44 The
White policy analysis, that divorce should not increase some chil-
dren's right to be supported while in college, was extended beyond
all logic. The court stated that if parental support can be required
after parents divorce, but not while they remain happily married,
"it would be for the benefit of the offspring of happily married
parents to sow seeds of discord in order to be assured of parental
support in pursuing a college education. ' 46 Even if the judge's
analysis was colorably related to reality, a child would indeed be
callous to follow such a course. Moreover, the "seeds of discord"
would necessarily have to fall upon fertile ground.
The Florida Supreme Court subsequently forced the first district
to recognize that an adult offspring who attends college can be
held to be dependent. In Crumpton v. Crumpton,4 a final judg-
40. 327 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
41. Id. at 74.
42. Id. at 75. Dwyer was followed in Mohammad v. Mohammad, 371 So. 2d 1070, 1072
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979), where the first district held that the trial court erred in re-
quiring, without a concomitant finding of dependency, that a father support his children
until they reach age 21.
43. 327 So. 2d at 75.
44. Id. The court stated:
The mere fact that a person is attending a university or college does not render
him or her dependent. Notwithstanding the dictum found in Finn v. Finn to the
effect that a parent has the obligation "to nurture, support educate and protect
his minor children" we are cited to no authority, and independent research has
failed to reveal any, for the proposition that sui juris offspring of parents living in
domestic tranquility and harmony have a legal right to require parental support
while attaining a college education.
Id.
45. Id.
46. 314 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975), remanded, 330 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1976).
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ment of divorce entered in 1971 provided that the father was to
pay child support until the court ordered otherwise. The trial court
later issued an order stating that the father's support obligation
would terminate upon the child's reaching her eighteenth birth-
day.47 The Florida Supreme Court issued an order remanding the
case in light of Finn.48 On remand, the first district, per Judge Mc-
Cord, reversed the trial court's order, noting that the order con-
tained an express finding that the child was dependent because of
her status as a full-time college student.49 Although it can be ar-
gued that the decision is tied to the prospective application of sec-
tion 743.07 and that the result would be different had the decree
been entered after 1973, it is clear that the first district's implica-
tion in Dwyer (that an offspring over age eighteen can never be
held to be dependent) has been repudiated by the supreme court.
Possibly the court was subtly rejecting the first district's failure to
follow the Finn definition of "dependency."
2. The Fourth District's Approach
The Fourth District Court of Appeal first addressed the issue of
whether a dissolution court may require parental college support
for healthy adult children in French v. French.50 The dissolution
court had ordered the father to pay five hundred dollars per month
for his adult children for as long as they remain "dependent" as
full time college students.5 1 The fourth district reversed, holding
that the students "do not become dependent in the eyes of the law
because they are in college."" It was observed that both offspring
were "able-bodied" and employable.58 The implication of this ob-
servation is that they were not physically or mentally disabled.
The fourth district has strongly rejected the supreme court's im-
plications in Finn, as is most clearly demonstrated in Kern v.
Kern. 4 In 1974, a final decree of dissolution was entered by the
47. Id. at 233.
48. Crumpton v. Crumpton, 330 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1976).
49. Crumpton v. Crumpton, 333 So. 2d 539, 540 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
50. 303 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
51. Id. at 669.
52. Id. The court also stated that "It]here are many moral obligations both parents have
to their children after they become of age, and providing college education when possible
may be one of them. However, it is not a legal obligation." Id.
53. Id.
54. 360 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978). It should be noted, however, that the
fourth district had previously stated that "[tihe recent case of Finn v. Finn . . . seems to
hold that dependency as a result of the bona fide pursuit of education may exist as to one
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trial court which required the father to support his child. After the
child reached majority, the mother sought modification of the de-
cree in order to require the father to provide monthly child sup-
port during the child's attendance at college. The modification was
granted and the father appealed, contending that a dissolution
court has no power to require a parent to support his adult chil-
dren in college.58
The fourth district reversed, holding that a dissolution court has
no power to modify a final decree to require support of a healthy
adult child." It was reasoned that section 743.07 must be read in
pari materia with section 61.13.57 Since section 61.13 implies that
child support can only be required of those parents "owing a duty
of support" to a child, the court fashioned a two-pronged test for
determining a court's power in a dissolution proceeding. First, a
parent must owe a duty of support to the adult child, and second,
that child must be dependent." Although an adult child attending
college may be deemed dependent, the court flatly held that a par-
ent has no obligation to provide a child with a college education.5 9
Although not cited as authority, the White policy analysis was
again utilized as the basis for the court's holding. It was observed
that a divorce should not increase the obligation of the parent to
contribute to his child's college education. Indeed, the court
pointed to unstated "constitutional infirmities" which would arise
due to the state's differing treatment. 0
According to the fourth district's opinion in Kern, a dissolution
court has no jurisdiction to rule on a motion for modification
which relates to the support of an adult child."1 It was reasoned
that the power of a court to modify its order of support only exists
for the period of time in which a parent owes a duty of support to
the child. Unless the child is physically or mentally disabled, this
duty terminates at the time the child reaches majority. Therefore,
between 18 and 21 years of age." Briggs v. Briggs, 312 So. 2d 762, 762 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1975)(citation omitted).
55. 360 So. 2d at 483.
56. Id. at 486.
57. Id. at 484. Section 61.13 provides, in part, that "[i]n a proceeding for dissolution of
marriage, the court may at any time order either or both parents owing a duty of support to
a child of the marriage to pay such support as from the circumstances of the parties and the
nature of the case is equitable." FLA. STAT. § 61.13(1) (1979)(emphasis added).
58. 360 So. 2d at 484.
59. Id. at 485.
60. Id. at 485 n.4.
61. Id. at 485.
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the court possesses no authority to modify, in a dissolution pro-
ceeding, the support obligations of a parent to his healty adult off-
spring.62 Thus, according to the fourth district, an ex-spouse may
no longer utilize the continuing jurisdiction of a dissolution court
to provide for support of an adult offspring. Rather, the dependent
adult must himself establish the parent's obligation of support in a
court of competent jurisdiction. 63 A dissolution court does possess
the power, however, to enforce an agreement between the parents
which provides that a parent will continue to support his child
past the age of majority."
Finally, contrary to the teaching of Finn, the court stated that a
parent is only obligated to support an adult child "in extraordinary
circumstances as when the child suffers severe physical or mental
incapacitation," and that a dissolution court is not the proper
forum to enforce such an obligation."
The fourth district also held that a dissolution court has no au-
thority to require a parent to provide his healthy adult child with a
college education in Genoe v. Genoe.66 Genoe involved a final judg-
ment of dissolution requiring the husband to provide $10,000 for
each child's college education. 67 The appellate court reversed that
portion of the judgment, holding that "[a] parent is not responsi-
ble for support after a child reaches his eighteenth birthday, ab-
sent legal dependence, and since attendance at college does not
render a child a legal dependent, courts have no authority to re-
quire parents to furnish their offspring such advanced
education.""
It is interesting to note that the opinion does not mention either
Finn or Kern, and does not examine the various judicial definitions
given to "dependent person." As authority for its proposition that
attendance at college does not make an adult offspring dependent,
62. Id.
63. Id. The court stated:
The award of child support, although made to the mother as the child's natural
guardian, is solely for the benefit of the child, who, because of the disability of
non-age, lacks the legal status to bring suit directly against his parent for support.
Under Florida law, when a child reaches eighteen years of age, this disability of
non-age is removed, and if an obligation of support exists, the child may proceed
in his own right in a court of competent jurisdiction to establish such obligation.
Id. (footnote and citation omitted).
64. Id. at 486 n.6.
65. Id. at 486.
66. 373 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
67. Id. at 941.
68. Id. at 942 (footnotes omitted).
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the court cited Krogen v. Krogen.ee There, the third district
adopted the White policy analysis, and distinguished Finn on the
basis that its specific holding was merely that section 743.07 was
not to be applied retroactively."0
3. The Second District Follows Finn
In contrast to the other district courts of appeal, the second dis-
trict has followed the Florida Supreme Court's lead in recognizing
a dissolution court's power to require a parent to contribute to the
support of an adult offspring who is enrolled in college. Like Finn,
the second district defines "dependent person" more broadly than
it has been defined in White and Kern.
This view has developed gradually over time. 1 In Cyr v. Cyr,"
the second district took the first step in recognizing a broad defini-
tion of "dependent person." The dissolution court included in its
final judgment of dissolution a proviso for child support which ob-
ligated the father to support his minor child until age eighteen, or
until the child "completes, [or] terminates [college], marries, or is
deceased or reaches the age of 21 years."78 Although the appellate
court held that the trial court had no power to require child sup-
port beyond the child's eighteenth birthday, it stated that section
61.13 empowers a court to modify the agreement after finding that
the adult child is dependent.7 4 The implication of this dictum is
69. 320 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
70. Id. at 484-85. The court stated that "for the benefit of the bench and bar of this
State, this decision should be certified to the Supreme Court of Florida as passing upon a
matter of great public interest." Id. at 485 n.2. For some unknown reason, however, the
decision was never reviewed by the supreme court.
71. The second district did not always follow Finn. See Kowalski v. Kowalski, 315 So. 2d
497 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975). In Kowalski, a final judgment of dissolution was entered
(presumably after the effective date of section 743.07) which required the father to support
his seventeen-year-old son until the son reached age twenty-one or completed or discontin-
ued his college education. Id. at 498. Approving White, the second district held that the
court had no authority to require such support in the absence of the father's agreement to
support his son. Id. The court perceptively stated that "some of us may wonder why a
father would expend the time, money and effort to complain to us because of an order com-
pelling support of his son while the son attempts to secure a college education." Id. See also
Coalla v. Coalla, 330 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
72. 354 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
73. Id. at 140.
74. Id. The court cited as authority the Third District Court of Appeal's decision in
Baldi v. Baldi, 323 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976). The factual situation in Baldi
was similar to the one in Cyr in that the court ordered support payments for a minor child
to continue until age 21. The third district held that although the trial court erred in order-
ing support payments past age 18, it could later modify the order based upon a finding of
dependency. Id. at 593. Interestingly, the court stated that "the term 'dependent' is defined
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that an adult college student could be adjudged dependent.
This implication became an express statement of approval in
Rollings v. Rollings.75 The court there stated that "[tihere is au-
thority in this state to require continuance of support of depen-
dent progeny past the age of majority, and, in certain instances,
when they attend college."7 6 The court held, however, that "under
the facts of this case" (which were not set out in the opinion), the
trial court erred in requiring a father to support his eighteen-year-
old daughter.77
In a most recent decision dealing with the question of what con-
stitutes a dependent person, Nicolay v. Nicolay7 8 the second dis-
trict expressly rejected Kern and White and followed the broad
definition of "dependent person" set out in Finn. In 1974, the dis-
solution court entered a final judgment of dissolution requiring the
father to support his two minor daughters and awarding his wife
permanent alimony. In 1977, upon the eldest daughter's reaching
age eighteen, the ex-spouse requested that the father assist in pro-
viding for the daughter's college education. When he refused, she
filed a petition for modification, which was later withdrawn after
the father relented and agreed to provide support for one year. 9 In
1978, the father petitioned for modification of his support obliga-
tions, alleging that his income had decreased. The mother
counterpetitioned, requesting support for both adult daughters.
The dissolution judge, finding that he had no power to require sup-
port for adults, denied the mother's petition. The mother then pe-
titioned for modification of alimony, alleging a change in circum-
stances brought about by her daughters' college expenses. The
dissolution court awarded the mother an increase in alimony, and
the father appealed.80
Mr. Nicolay's principal argument on appeal was that the dissolu-
tion court possessed no authority to require a divorced parent to
provide a college education to his adult offspring.81 The court re-
jected this argument, and noted that "it has not been universally
in White v. white... and in Finn v. Finn." Id. (citation omitted). The differences between
the two decisions' definitions, however, were conveniently ignored.
75. 362 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
76. Id. at 701.
77. Id.
78. 387 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
79. Id. at 500-01.
80. Id. at 501.
81. Id.
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accepted and, in fact, appears to rest on a tenuous foundation."8 '
The court summarily examined the White and Kern analysis of
the requirements of sections 743.07 and 61.13, and also summarily
examined the supreme court's opposing analysis found in Finn and
its progeny.83 In the court's view, the Finn analysis was more per-
suasive. It was noted that the posture of the case was an appeal
from an alimony award rather than from a child support order or
modification of an order." The court stated, however, that "there
is no fixed rule forbidding an order of increased child support to
finance a child's college education up to the age of twenty-one." 88
Contrary to Kern, the second district court ruled that depen-
dency of an adult child can be determined by a dissolution court
during proceedings to modify a child support order8s The court's
opinion implies that the dissolution court's authority to determine
the dependency of a child exists only until the child reaches age
twenty-one.8 7 The rationale is that the legislature's lowering of the
age of majority was not intended to restrict any existing parental
obligations to support their minor children in college. On the other
hand, the prior obligation to educate a minor child until age
twenty-one was not meant to be expanded or lengthened.s
Recently, the second district again held that a divorced parent
may be obligated to support a healthy, majority-age child who is
attending college. In Berger v. Hollander," a dissolution court re-
fused to enforce a New Jersey judgment requiring the payment of
child support arrearages. The court reasoned that it would violate
equal protection to require a divorced parent to support a healthy
82. Id.
83. Id. at 502-05.
84. Id. at 505. The court noted that an alimony award may be increased, subject to the
ex-spouse's ability to pay, when there has been a substantial change in her financial circum-
stances. Id. at 506. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980); Gensemer v.
Gensemer, 383 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980); FLA. STAT. § 61.14 (1979). Accord-
ingly, the trial court did not commit error when it increased the award of alimony. 387 So.
2d at 506.
85. 387 So.2d at 505 (emphasis in original)(footnote omitted).
86. Id. at 506.
87. Id. at 505-06 n.5. See also Winikoff v. Winikoff, 339 So. 2d 262, 263 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1976)("Florida law clearly holds that a parent's duty to support an adult child's educa-
tion terminates at the age of 21"); Briggs v. Briggs, 312 So. 2d 762, 762 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1975)("We do not interpret either § 743.07, F.S., or the Finn case as authorizing a
court to require a parent to support a child over 21 years of age, whether for educational
purposes or otherwise, unless the child is dependent as a result of physical or mental
deficiencies").
88. 387 So. 2d at 505-06.
89. 391 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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adult child attending college when a married parent has no such
duty of support.'0 The second district reversed, holding that com-
ity compelled enforcement of the New Jersey judgment.91 Citing
Nicolay, the court stated that "neither the public policy of New
Jersey nor that of Florida is contravened by requiring a divorced
parent, under certain circumstances, to provide an adult child with
a college education.""
II. A DISSOLUTION COURT POSSESSES AUTHORITY TO ORDER
SUPPORT FOR AN ADULT, DEPENDENT OFFSPRING
There is a dictum in Kern which states that once a child reaches
majority, a dissolution court loses jurisdiction to enforce or modify
an order relating to child support." The rationale is that child sup-
port is imposed upon the parent who is the child's "natural guard-
ian" solely for the benefit of the minor child, who is unable to
bring suit directly against the supporting parent. 4 It is argued that
when a duty of support allegedly exists, only the adult child, who
has lost his natural guardian by operation of law, has standing to
sue to establish that duty.' 5
The Kern court cites Rudnick v. Solomon" as authority for its
analysis of the capacity or standing issue. Rudnick, however, does
not directly support the court's conclusions. In that case, the natu-
ral guardian of an eighteen year old child died, and the father
thereafter sought to modify a support agreement which required
him to support the child until age twenty-one. The child's motion
to intervene was denied by the dissolution court and it also
granted the father's motion to modify the support agreement.9
The Third District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the
child could intervene." Although Rudnick supports the proposi-
tion that a adult offspring has standing to enforce a parental obli-
90. Id. at 718.
91. Id. at 719. The court defined comity as "the practice by which one court follows the
decisions of another court on a like question, though not bound by the law of precedence to
do so." Id. (citation omitted).
92. Id. (footnote omitted).
93. 360 So. 2d at 485.
94. Id. The court cited as authority FLA. STAT. § 744.301(1) (1979), which provides, in
part, that "[ijf the marriage between the parents is dissolved, the natural guardianship shall
belong to the parent to whom the custody of the child is awarded."
95. 360 So. 2d at 485.
96. 311 So. 2d 385 (FP. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
97. Id. at 386.
98. Id.
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gation of support, the possibility that the natural guardian also has
standing to enforce that obligation is not ruled out. In fact, Rud-
nick is an example of a situation in which the jurisdiction of a dis-
solution court extended to the enforcement of an obligation to sup-
port an adult child.
The limits of judicial power in a dissolution proceeding to mod-
ify the support order for an adult dependent has been recently ad-
dressed by the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Fagan v. Fagan."
In 1973, a final judgment of dissolution provided that the father
was to provide child support "until such time as each of them be-
comes self-supporting, married or emancipated (by any other rea-
son than by virtue of reaching the age of eighteen)."100 The judg-
ment also provided that the father would pay for all expenses
which accrued because of his son's "mental disorders, disabilities
or impairments."101 After the son reached age twenty-one, the fa-
ther terminated support payments and the mother sought enforce-
ment of the support provisions of the final judgment. The dissolu-
tion court allowed enforcement, finding that the child was
incapable of supporting himself, and the husband appealed.10'
On appeal, it was contended that dissolution is an improper
forum to enforce child support payments to an adult dependent
child.103 The fifth district rejected this contention and held that
the provision in section 743.07 that support for dependent adult
offspring can be required by "any court of competent jurisdic-
tion"'' "° indicates that such support can be required by a dissolu-
tion court in an enforcement order.105
Fagan is more persuasive than Kern. Since section 61.13 empow-
ers a court which enters a final judgment of dissolution to exercise
"continuing jurisdiction" to modify the child support provisions
"when the child... has reached the age of 18 years,"' " the court
must necessarily be empowered to determine at that time whether
support should continue because of the adult child's depen-
99. 381 So.2d 278 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).




104. See note 2 supra.
105. 381 So. 2d at 279-80. The court stated that "[c]learly, the dissolution court is em-
powered to order child support for a child beyond the age of 18, if he is dependent, and such
court is the proper forum to determine whether the status of dependency has ended, after
the child attains the age of 18 years." Id. at 280.
106. See note 2 supra.
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dency 1 07 Otherwise, the word "modify" would denote only a power
to terminate. Continuation, the normal alternative, must be sup-
ported by a finding of "dependency." If the child is found to be
dependent, it follows that the court may also enforce child support
provisions for such dependent adult offspring.10 8 According to the
reasoning in Kern, a dissolution court could determine the ques-
tion of dependency upon a motion to terminate or modify child
support for a child who has reached majority, but it could not en-
force an obligation to support an adult child found to be depen-
dent. Presumably, the child would have to enforce the obligation in
a separate action or would be forced to request leave to intervene.
Certainly, judicial economy would not be served by this require-
ment. Moreover, it is far-fetched to state, as the Kern court does,
that the custodial parent of a dependent adult offspring "has no
pecuniary interest" in litigation to enforce a support obligation.10 '
If the dependent adult offspring is institutionalized, would the
court find that the private institution has no pecuniary interest as
a creditor in assuring that the parent complies with his duty of
support? The notion that an adult is dependent necessarily implies
that he is dependent on someone; he is incapable of existing inde-
pendently.110 Most likely, the custodial parent 1 is the person
upon whom the offspring has been initially dependent. In fact, the
custodial parent is also equally obligated to contribute to the adult
child's support.11'
III. THE White AND Kern ANALYIsis IS DEFECTIVE
In order to determine whether a parent can be required to sup-
port his adult children in college, it is necessary to examine the
premises which are implied, as well as expressed, in the White and
Kern line of cases. The White/Kern analysis is defective in terms
of the limited definition given to "dependent person," the interpre-
107. 381 So. 2d at 279-80.
108. Id. at 280. See also George v. George, 360 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978),
where the court held that a dissolution court's finding that a minor child was dependent
could be modified (or, by implication, enforced) upon petition to the dissolution court after
the child reaches age 18. Id. at 1110.
109. 360 So. 2d at 485.
110. "Dependent" is defined, in part, as being "unable to exist, sustain oneself, or act
suitable or normally without the assistance or direction of another or others." WRmsRa's 3d
NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1976).
111. "Custodial parent" is used in the sense of the parent with whom the dependent
child lives.
112. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(1) (1979).
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tation given to the supreme court's decision in Finn, the policy
considerations relied upon, and the fear of constitutional infirmity.
A. The White/Kern Definition of "Dependent Person" is too
Limited
In White, the first district summarily interpreted the use in sec-
tion 743.07 of the term "dependent person," in the grammatical
vicinity of the term "crippled child," to mean that the legislature
intended that a parent be required to support only those adult
children who are mentally or physically disabled.118 The implica-
tion is that the use of "crippled child" indicates that the legisla-
ture was focusing upon physical or mental incapacity which ren-
ders a person dependent.
The law as originally enacted, however, states that "[tihis sec-
tion shall not prohibit any court of competent jurisdiction from
requiring support for a dependent person beyond the age of 18
years; and provided further that any crippled child . . shall re-
ceive benefits. 11 4 It may be argued with equal or greater persua-
siveness that the legislature, by its use of the words "and provided
further," intended that the phrase "dependent person" include
more than mere physically or mentally disabled persons. As Judge
McCord stated in his White dissent, the legislature could have
used the term "disabled person," rather than "dependent person,"
had it so desired to limit the statute's application. 18
The Kern interpetation requires that section 743.07 be read in
pari materia with section 61.13. According to the court, this man-
dates a two-fold finding: (1) that the parent has a duty to support
his adult children and (2) that the adult child is dependent; and
while an adult child attending college may be characterized as de-
pendent, there is never a duty to provide a child with a college
education.116 The court stated that "[a]lthough a parent may suffer
a moral obligation to assist children in acquiring an advanced edu-
cation, we find nothing in either the jurisprudence or the statutes
113. 296 So. 2d at 619.
114. Act of July 1, 1973, ch. 73-21, 1973 FI. Laws 59 (emphasis added)(current version
at FLA. STAT. § 743.07 (1980)). Apparently, the words "provided further that" were mistak-
enly omitted when ch. 73-21 was originally published in the 1973 volume of Florida
Statutes.
115. 296 So. 2d at 625. Judge McCord stated that the legislature "did not limit depen-
dent persons to disabled persons or to disabled dependent persons, although it could have
done so if it had intended such limited interpretation." Id.
116. 360 So. 2d at 484.
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of this state which makes such a moral obligation legally
enforceable. '11 7
The assumption that a divorced parent has no statutory duty to
support an adult offspring is erroneous. To the contrary, it can be
argued that the legislature empowered courts to impose such a
duty of support by enacting section 743.07. Section 61.13's recogni-
tion of a "duty of support" may be read to include the judicially-
imposed parental support requirement that section 743.07 allows
for a dependent adult offspring. If one accepts Judge McCord's
reasoning that the legislature's use of the word "dependent"
(rather than "disabled") indicates that the duty of support may
extend to college students, it can be argued that the legislature
contemplated that support of an adult offspring in college is in-
deed part of the "duty of support" which a dissolution court is
empowered to satisfy under section 61.13.
On its face, section 743.07 is not at all limited to dissolution pro-
ceedings. Therefore, if a broad definition of "dependent person" is
accepted, it may be argued that the section would allow a court "of
competent jurisdiction" to require married parents to support their
healthy adult offspring while attending college. This is the statuto-
rily-imposed legal obligation which the court in Kern found to be
absent."'
In fact, there is authority from other jurisdictions which sup-
ports the proposition that a college education is a "necessary"
which married parents are bound to provide. 119 Although this duty
to provide a college education when a child is capable and the par-
ent is financially able120 is arguably unenforceable against married
parents, it is, nevertheless, a duty. As one commentator has stated:
Presently, while no courts have seen fit to inquire into the par-
ents' exercise of discretion as to whether their children should
have a college education as long as the marital relationship re-
mains intact, the interruption or cessation of this relationship has
prompted many courts to exercise their discretion and provide in
the divorce decree,. . . that the father must provide the children
with a college education."'
The fourth district's presumption in Kern that a married parent is
117. Id. at 485.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., H. CLARK, JR., supra note 15, at § 15.1; Annot., 56 A.L.R. 2d 1207 (1957).
120. H. CLARK, JR., supra note 15, at § 15.1.
121. Note, College Education as a Legal Necessary, 18 VAND. L. REv. 1400, 1402 (1965).
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never legally obligated to provide an offspring with a college educa-
tion may be erroneous, especially in light of the Florida Supreme
Court's obvious views on the matter expressed in Finn.
Of course, the duty of support would not be mandatory. Section
61.13 provides that a dissolution court "may at any time order ei-
ther or both parents owing a duty of support to a child of the mar-
riage to pay such support as from the circumstances of the parties
and the nature of the case is equitable.""'1 2 The statute only re-
quires case-by-case determinations and not the sweeping legislative
rejection of jurisdiction for all cases. Therefore, if the court finds
that the parents are financially unable to render college support
for their adult offspring, it need not order such support.123
A "dependent person" should be broadly defined as "one who
looks to another for support and maintenance," and "who relies on
another for the reasonable necessities of life."' 124 This definition
would include healthy adult offspring who are pursuing a college
education in good faith and who possess "a need for help beyond
[their] own reasonable capacity."' 125 Such a definition would not be
unprecedented in Florida statutory law. For the purposes of the
Department of Education's "aid to families with dependent chil-
dren" program,2 6 a "dependent child" is defined as "any person
under the age of 18, or under the age of 21 and still in school, who
has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of death,
continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity
of a parent.""11 7 Here, the legislature has provided additional reme-
dies1 28 for healthy adult offspring who are attending school. 22
A broad notion of dependency is also illustrated by the statutory
obligations imposed by many states upon children for the support
122. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(1) (1979)(emphasis added).
123. See Golay v. Golay, 210 P.2d 1022 (Wash. 1949), in which the Washington Supreme
Court stated that "[a] rich man, well able to pay, might very well be held from [sic] a
college education of an extended and expensive sort. However, the father in this instance is
not a rich man, and from the evidence in the record, can scarcely spare any money from
[sic] his own needs." Id. at 1023. Accord, Childers v. Childers, 575 P.2d 201 (Wash. 1978).
See also Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1390 (IM. 1978).
124. Childers v. Childers, 575 P.2d 201, 205 (Wash. 1978).
125. Finn v. Finn, 312 So.2d 726, 730 (Fla. 1975).
126. FLA. STAT. §§ 409.255-2597 (1979).
127. FLA. STAT. § 409.2554(2) (1979)(emphasis added).
128. FLA. STAT. § 409.2551 (1979) provides, in part, that "it is the legislative intent that
the remedies provided herein are in addition to, and not in lieu of, existing remedies."
129. Although an opposing argument can be made, it seems apparent that the use of the
word "school" contemplates that persons between the ages of 18 and 21 are attending
college.
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of their dependent parents.8 0 These "family responsibility" stat-
utes are intended to shift the burden of support for elderly indi-
gents from the state to certain named relatives. 18 ' Although other
relatives are sometimes included in the statutes, children are
nearly always included as relatives who have a "family responsibil-
ity" to their parents.'83
Like the support obligation for adult dependent children, the
elderly person must be "dependent" because of the absence of eco-
nomic self-sufficiency caused by mental or physical disability, or,
in some states, because of "social conditions causing unemploy-
ment." 8  In addition, the "family responsibility" obligation, like
the support obligation in section 61.13, is generally contingent
upon a judicial determination of the relative's ability to pay.'" The
amount of support which is required to maintain the relative is
also a question of fact.185
Related devices for shifting the burden of support for indigents
from the state to relatives are legislative enactments requiring re-
imbursement to the state by responsible relatives for state aid dis-
tributed to the indigent.'" The two primary methods of reim-
bursement are enactments which directly impose the requirement
on responsible relatives for the cost of maintaining indigent per-
sons in state institutions" 7 and enactments which collect at death
from the estates of public assistance recipients.'"
Florida utilizes the latter method. Section 409.345(1), Florida
Statutes,18 ' provides that the acceptance of public assistance cre-
ates a debt in favor of the state which is enforceable by filing a
claim against the recipient's estate within one year of his death. 4 0
This requires the children or other relatives to indirectly pay for
130. H. CLARK, JR, supra note 15, at § 6.7. See generally Mandelker, Family Responsi-
bility Under the American Poor Laws: I, 54 MIcH. L. REv. 497 (1956). See also W. KUCH-
LER, Law OF SUPPORT 29, 37 (3d ed. 1980).
131. H. CLARK, JR., supra note 15, at § 6.7.
132. Id.
133. Mandelker, supra note 130, at 516.
134. Id. at 520-27.
135. Id. at 528-32.
136. See generally, Baldus, Welfare as a Loan: An Empirical Study of the Recovery of
Public Assistance Payments in the United States, 25 STAN. L. Rav. 123 (1973); Annot. 75
A.L.R. 3d 1159 (1977).
137. See Annot., 75 A.L.R.3d 1159, 1160-61 (1977); Annot. 20 A.L.R.3d 363 (1968).
138. Baldus, supra note 136, at 130.
139. (1979).
140. These claims have a class seven priority during payment of the expenses of admin-
istration and obligations of the estate. Id.
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their dependent parent's support with the proceeds which would
otherwise be passed to them as heirs or devisees.
B. Finn was Misconstrued in Kern
The assumption that the Florida Supreme Court does not con-
template an enforceable duty to support an adult college student is
also erroneous. In Finn, the court stated:
A person over 18 and less than 21 may indeed be dependent on
the help of others to obtain what education and training is
needed to be competitive in the economic system in which he
must make his way. He and society have a right to expect his
parents to meet that need to the reasonable extent of their abil-
ity to do so, and nothing in [section 743.07(2)] says otherwise.'
Kern construes Finn as support for the more limited proposition
that the lowered age of majority does not abrogate a court's power
to order child support for a dependent adult offspring, but implies
that no duty exists under any circumstances to provide that off-
spring with a college education.""' This reading of Finn completely
ignores the supreme court's obvious belief that a court may require
a parent to provide his child with a college education. 43
C. Finn's Policy Considerations Have Been Neglected
The policy considerations underlying the Finn decision have
been completely overlooked and ignored by White and its progeny.
Finn recognizes that the age and qualifications required for entry
into the labor force have extended family dependency relationships
far beyond the circumstances which justified the old doctrine that
the parental duty to educate does not include providing a college
education.1 4 4 Economic success generally requires a degree from an
141. 312 So. 2d at 731 (emphasis added). See also Rollings v. Rollings, 362 So. 2d 700
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978), where the second district stated that "[t]here is authority in
this state to require continuance of support of dependent progeny past the age of majority,
and, in certain instances, when they attend college." Id. at 701 (footnote omitted).
142. 360 So. 2d at 484.
143. This is underscored by the court's statement that:
It is recognized that a parent has the obligation to nurture, support, educate,
and protect his minor children and the child has the right to call on him for the
discharge of this duty .... If there is a duty to educate it would naturally follow
that pursuits of college education by the offspring does [sic] not of itself negative
a need for his parent's assistance.
312 So. 2d at 730. See also Esteb v. Esteb, 244 P. 264, 267 (Wash. 1926).
144. 312 So. 2d at 731.
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institution of higher learning.14' Intellectual and emotional fulfill-
ment may require stimulation which can only be received in col-
lege. The state's interest in developing a well-informed citizenry, as
exemplified by the massive state system of primary, secondary and
post-secondary education, is also promoted by the parental provi-
sion of higher education."'
On the other hand, the first district in White only recognized
that a parent should "encourage" his child to attain a college edu-
cation. 47 The fourth district in Kern stated that an advanced edu-
cation is a "valuable asset," but that a parent has no legal obliga-
tion to provide it to his child.14' The court in Dwyer v. Dwyer'14
held that requiring a divorced parent to support his child, while
not imposing the same requirement upon a happily married par-
ent, would encourage children to attempt to destroy their parents'
marriage.150 These policy considerations are too myopic in scope
and are not useful in modern times. For these reasons, they are not
persuasive.
D. No Constitutional Infirmity Exists
The alleged constitutional infirmity alluded to in Kern must be
examined. Interpreting section 743.07 as allowing a judge to award
college support for an adult child could violate the equal protec-
tion provisions of both the United States and Florida constitu-
145. See Comment, The Duty of a Father Under Pennsylvania Law to Support His
Child in College, 18 VmL. L. Rav. 243, 243 nn.1 & 2 (1972).
146. See, e.g., Pass v. Pass, 118 So. 2d 769 (Miss. 1960). In Pass, the Mississippi Su-
preme Court stated that higher education is necessary for the training of good citizens.
A contrary view may have been justified in former times when the needs of the
family, and of society, and of government were less exacting than they are today.
But we are living today in an age of keen competition, and if the children of today
who are to be the citizens of tomorrow are to take their rightful place in a complex
order of society and government, and discharge the duties of citizenship as well as
meet with success the responsibilities devolving upon them in their relations with
their fellow man, the church, the state and nation, it must be recognized that their
parents owe them the duty to the extent of their financial capacity to provide for
them the training and education which will be of such benefit to them in the dis-
charge of the responsibilities of citizenship.. . . We can see no good reason why
this duty should not extend to a college education.
Id. at 773.
147. 296 So. 2d at 623. See also Sluder v. Sluder, 326 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1976), where the court noted that the White holding contemplated a moral parental duty to
educate his child. "We did not hold nor infer [sic] that a father may not or should not aid
his child, particularly in regard to the obtaining of an education." Id. at 253.
148. 360 So. 2d at 485.
149. 327 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
150. Id. at 75.
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tions."1 The rationale of the argument is that the state has no rea-
sonable justification for treating adult children of divorced parents
differently than the adult children of married parents. " " Although
it can be argued that section 743.07 may provide an adult child of
married parents with an enforceable right to a college education, "
it will be assumed for the purposes of analysis that a distinction
exists between the support obligation of married and divorced
parents.
Strict scrutiny of such a distinction is improper because the
United States Supreme Court has held that a dissolved marriage
does not fall within the ambit of the right to privacy in "matters
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relation-
ships, child rearing and education."'" Moreover, divorced parents
are not a "distinct and insular minority" subject to special judicial
protection through strict scrutiny of the alleged legislative classifi-
cation touching upon them."5 Therefore, the legislative classifica-
tion based upon marital status will withstand federal constitu-
tional attack if reasonably related to a legitimate state purpose."
The alleged constitutional infirmity has been directly confronted
by the Washington Supreme Court in Childers v. Childers. 1 7 In
that case, the court approved a decree of dissolution which pro-
vided, in part, that the father support his three sons past the age
of majority while they attend college.'" A Washington court of ap-
peals had reversed the original decision of the dissolution court,
reasoning that both the United States and Washington constitu-
tions would be violated because there is no reasonable ground for
distinguishing between divorced and married parents.""
A Washington statute provided, in part, that "the court may or-
der either or both parents owing a duty of support to any child of
the marriage dependent upon either or both spouses to pay an
151. 360 So. 2d at 485. The constitutional provisions which are allegedly violated are
U.S. COSST. amend. XIV and FLA. CoNSr. art. I, § 2.
152. 360 So. 2d at 485. See also Veron, Parental Support of Post-Majority Children in
College: Changes and Challenges, 17 J. FAS. L. 645, 668 (1978-79).
153. See note 114 and accompanying text supra.
154. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976). See also Veron, supra note 152, at 674.
155. Veron, supra note 152, at 674.
156. Id. Veron states that "[tihe support obligation infringes on [the parents'] economic
interests, which traditionally have been subjected to a reasonableness test." Id.
157. 575 P.2d 201 (Wash. 1978). For an analysis of the Childers decision, see 54 WASH.
L. Rxv. 459 (1979).
158. 575 P.2d at 209.
159. Childers v. Childers, 552 P.2d 83, 85 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976), rev'd in part, 575 P.2d
201 (Wash. 1978).
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amount reasonable or necessary for his support."1 60 The dissolu-
tion court's finding that the children were dependent was held not
to be an abuse of its discretion,1 and it was also noted that di-
vorced parents have a duty of support which includes, under the
proper circumstances, a duty to provide their children with a col-
lege education. 162
The distinction between the support requirements imposed upon
divorced and married parents was then examined to determine
whether it passed constitutional muster. The court held that the
classification's alleged "inequality" was reasonable and justifiable,
and was therefore constitutional."63 Various justifications were ad-
vanced. First, it was noted that the state has an obligation to pro-
tect the "victims" of divorce.'" Second, it was observed that a di-
vorced parent often will not provide the child with the amount of
support that, but for the divorce, he would otherwise have pro-
vided.1 5 In addition, the court stated that the state had an impor-
tant interest in developing a well-educated citizenry.16"
Similarly, two Illinois statutes that allow the provision of college
support for adult offspring have withstood constitutional challenge.
One statute provides that a court may compel parental support for
education of any "minor, dependent or incompetent child" of a
broken marriage.167 A related statute enables a dissolution court to
160. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09 (1974)(emphasis added).
161. 575 P.2d at 205. The court broadly defined "dependent" to mean "one who looks to
another for support and maintenance, one who is in fact dependent, one who relies on an-
other for the reasonable necessities of life. Dependency is a question of fact to be deter-
mined from all surrounding circumstances... ." Id.
162. Id. at 206-07. See also Esteb v. Esteb, 244 P. 264 (Wash. 1926).
163. 575 P.2d at 209.
164. Id. at 207. The court cited a portion of the following passage from Washburn, Post-
Majority Support: Oh Dad, Poor Dad, 44 TMP. L.Q. 319, 327-28 (1971):
A number of courts adopt the policy that a child should not suffer because his
parents are divorced. The child of divorced parents should be in no worse position
than a child from an unbroken home whose parents could be expected to supply a
college education. Some courts have denied this rationale when faced with the
apparent anomaly of compelling a divorced father to send his child to college,
while parents who are still married cannot be compelled to do likewise. However,
the judiciary's protective attitude toward children of broken homes is sufficient
grounds to distinguish the two situations.
165. 575 P.2d at 208-09. As authority, the court cited Esteb v. Esteb, 244 P. 264, 267
(Wash. 1926); and Underwood v. Underwood, 298 P. 318, 320 (Wash. 1931).
166. 575 P.2d at 208-09.
167. ILL Rzv. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(d) (1975). That section provides:
(d) The court may protect and promote the best interests of the children by
setting aside a portion of the jointly or separately held estates of the parties in a
separate fund or trust for the support, maintenance, education, and general wel-
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compel parental support for the education of an adult child.'" In
Kujawinski v. Kujawinski,1'6 it was contended that these statutes
violated equal protection in that they constituted an impermissible
classification between divorced and married parents.17 0 These con-
tentions were rejected on the basis that the imposition of an obli-
gation to support adult offspring was "reasonably related to a legit-
imate state purpose. 1 7 1  As in Childers, it was noted that a
noncustodial parent may not support his children to the same ex-
tent that he would have had he not been divorced.1 72 Therefore, it
was held that minimizing "any economic and educational disad-
vantages to-children of divorced parents" was a legitimate legisla-
tive purpose.7
fare of any minor, dependent, or incompetent child of the parties.
168. ILL. Rzv. STAT. ch. 40, § 513 (1975). This section is a clear delineation of a legisla-
tive purpose to provide for both disabled and dependent adult progeny:
The court may award sums of money out of the property and income of either
or both parties for the support of the child or children of the parties who have
attained majority and are not otherwise emancipated only when such child is men-
tally or physically disabled; and the application therefor may be made before or
after such child has attained majority age. The Court [sic] also may make such
provision for the education and maintenance of the child or children, whether of
minor or majority age, out of the property of either or both of its parents as equity
may require, whether application is made therefore before or after such child has,
or children have, attained majority age. In making such awards, the court shall
consider all relevant factors which shall appear reasonable and necessary,
including:
(a) The financial resources of both parents.
(b) The standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not
been dissolved.
(c) The financial resources of the child.
Id.
169. 376 N.E.2d 1382 (Ill. 1978).
170. Id. at 1389.
171. Id. See also Kelsey v. Panarelli, 363 N.E.2d 1363 (Mass. App. Ct. 1977). In that
case, a Massachusetts appellate court declined to address a constitutional challenge to a
statute which empowered a dissolution court to provide for support of an adult offspring.
However, a concurring judge found that the statute represented a
reasonable legislative attempt to secure to dependent children of broken homes
advantages customarily made available to children of other homes and comparable
age. In families that remain together, decisions by parents whether to terminate
support when their children reach the age of majority are usually tempered by
consideration of the educational and economic realities of our time and are in any
event decisions jointly arrived at by the parents. There is nothing in the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which bars the Legislature from
making reasonable provision for cases where the familial decision making process
has broken down.
Id. at 1365.
172. 376 N.E.2d at 1389-90.
173. Id. at 1390.
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In addition to the justifications advanced in Childers and
Kujawinski, it can be argued that children of broken marriages
must be legally protected from the possible decrease in support en-
gendered by a parent's subsequent marriage. If a parent remarries
and begets subsequent offspring, he may be more likely to fulfill
his legal and moral obligations to those children before he fulfills
his similar obligations to the offspring of the dissolved marriage.
This is especially true with respect to adult offspring, who are
likely to have lowest priority in the parent's mind. For this reason,
the law must interpose judicial protections of the right to parental
support for the offspring of broken marriages, in appropriate cases.
It may be argued that this justification would constitute a bur-
den upon the right to remarry in violation of the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause. Recently, in Zablocki v.
Redhail,174 the United States Supreme Court held that child sup-
port obligations which constitute barriers to remarriage must be
justified by some "sufficiently important state interests. '17 8 A Wis-
consin statute required that a person may not remarry if he is in
arrears in his support obligations.1 7  However, the Court stated
that "reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with
decisions to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be
imposed.1' 77 Florida has not enacted any statute which would sig-
nificantly interfere with the decision to remarry. Likewise, a deci-
sion to remarry, with the concomitant responsibilities toward one's
second family, should not be utilized to justify ignoring the duty to
support one's prior family.
Florida's equal protection analysis mirrors the federal analysis
and the analysis of other state jurisdictions. A legislative classifica-
tion will be sustained unless it is arbitrary and erroneous.1" In
fact, the Florida Supreme Court has recently stated that "[ijf the
courts can conceive of any conditions which will warrant the classi-
174. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
175. Id. at 388.
176. Id. at 375.
177. Id. at 386 (citing Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977)).
178. See, e.g., Hunter v. Flowers, 43 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1949), where the Florida Supreme
Court stated:
Wide discretion is vested in the Legislature in making the classification, and
every presumption is in favor of the validity of the statute. The decision of the
Legislature as to what is a sufficient distinction to warrant the classification will




fication made, they will not interfere to strike down the legislation
as a denial of the equal protection of the laws. '' 17e Therefore, the
Childers and Kujawinski rationales can also be used to sustain the
alleged classification between divorced and married persons.180
CONCLUSION
Even though the Florida Supreme Court has indicated that the
phrase "dependent person" should be broadly defined, the district
courts of appeal continue to be in conflict. Until the supreme court
issues a clear and precise answer to whether a dissolution court
may award child support to a healthy adult offspring attending
college, this conflict apparently will continue. If the supreme court
clearly holds that section 743.07 empowers a court of competent
jurisdiction to compel support for a healthy adult offspring, disso-
lution courts will then be enabled, under the proper circumstances,
to order support of a healthy adult college-bound offspring of the
marriage pursuant to section 61.13.
179. City of Miami Beach v. Frankel, 363 So. 2d 555, 559 (Fla. 1978)(quoting Riley v.
Lawson, 143 So. 619, 622 (Fla. 1932)).
180. Although the constitutional issue was not directly addressed, the second district has
recently reversed a dissolution court's holding that awarding child support for healthy, ma-
jority-age children would violate equal protection. Berger v. Hollander, 391 So. 2d 716 (FI.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980). See notes 89-92 and accompanying text supra.
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